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THE OPAQUENESS OF FAIR VALUE ASSETS AND SYSTEMATIC RISK
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By Jody Wayne Bland
Department of Economics
Faculty Mentor: Jeff Jones
Department of Finance
Abstract
 Opacity has economy-wide implications. A lack of 
information, whether from non-disclosure or complexity of 
business, creates uncertainty that even the most sophisticated 
of investors must face. In this paper, I analyze the relationship 
between opacity and the systematic risk of bank holding 
companies. Specifically, I find that investments in opaque assets 
required to be reported at fair value significantly affect the levels 
of financial institutions’ systematic risk. Furthermore, I provide 
evidence that firm investments in opaque assets contribute to 
systematic risk to an even greater degree during times of financial 
crisis.
I. Introduction
 Accurately assessing the true economic value of any firm 
can be an arduous task. When attempting to assess the underlying 
value of a portfolio of assets, information becomes critical. A 
lack of information, whether as a result of non-disclosure or 
complexity of business, creates uncertainty that even the most 
sophisticated of investors must face. Furthermore, the inherent 
nature of the banking industry lends itself to even greater 
informational asymmetries that manifest themselves in the form 
of opacity (Morgan, 2002). the existence of opacity in banks has 
economy-wide implications due to the vital role that financial 
institutions play in general economic activity (Bernanke, 1983). 
In this paper, I examine the relationship between financial opacity 
and the systematic risk of bank holding companies. specifically, 
I investigate the impact of investments in assets required to 
be reported at fair value on the systematic risk of financial 
institutions.
 the consequences of opacity have justified special regulatory 
oversight within the financial industry, as investors are forced 
to use non-firm specific valuation parameters to assess firm 
specific assets (Flannery, Kwan, and nimalendran, 2004). In 
opaque industries such as banking, contagion that arises as a 
consequence of industry-wide revaluation around firm-specific 
events engenders an environment conducive to the development 
of speculative bubbles and crashes. Arising from the inability of 
investors to distinguish between bank-specific and systematic 
events, contagion is a product of information asymmetry 
(Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Disclosure standards attempt to 
mitigate risks associated with opacity and information asymmetry 
by reducing the information gap between bank-insiders and 
investors. However, even full disclosure may not adequately 
resolve the problems associated with opacity (Jones, Lee, and 
Yeager, 2011a). 
 opacity also influences the composition of a firm’s risk. 
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) show how opaque markets tend 
to have greater systematic risk and lower idiosyncratic risk. the 
positive relationship between opacity and systematic risk occurs 
because, in the absence of reliable, firm-specific information, a 
firm’s equity price tends to just “follow along” with the overall 
movement of the market. Jones, Lee, and Yeager (2011a) 
demonstrate how the increasing opacity of banks during the period 
2000-2006 increased the systematic risk of banks while decreasing 
idiosyncratic risk. Moreover, the more opaque banks suffered the 
greatest price decline during the 2007 financial crisis.
In this paper, I use a recent change in U.s. accounting rules 
to examine the impact of opacity on the systematic risk of banks. 
In 2007, Us accounting regulatory bodies introduced sFAs 157, 
Fair Value Measurement, to address the increasing investment 
by financial institutions in illiquid and opaque assets. sFAs 157 
requires firms to report certain assets at fair value, classified 
into categories of Level 1, 2, and 3. Across Level 1, 2, and 3 
classifications, investors face greater degrees of information risk 
– uncertainty regarding the valuation parameters for underlying 
assets. to investigate the contributions of opacity to systematic 
risk, I utilize such fair value measurements to capture increasing 
levels of illiquidity and opacity. consistent with previous finance 
literature, my results show that opacity is positively related to the 
systematic risk of banks.
II. Hypothesis Development and Research Design
My hypotheses and analysis build upon the assertions 
in previous work that information risk of bank assets is non-
diversifiable in an economy (easley and o’Hara 2004; Lambert, 
Leuz, and Verrachia 2007; Jones, Lee, and Yeager 2011b). 
When one bank’s assets are particularly hard to value due to 
their opaque nature, outside investors must turn to idiosyncratic 
valuation parameters of other opaque yet seemingly similar firms. 
consequentially, the correlation between the entire industry is 
intensified. As the industry-wide asset composition of financial 
firms contains relatively greater degrees of opaque assets than the 
non-financial industry, investors face difficulty in discriminating 
across good banks and bad banks (Morgan 2002). such a scenario 
creates return synchronicity, reduces idiosyncratic risk, and 
increases systematic risk (Jones, Lee, and Yeager, 2011b). 
to evaluate the impact of opacity on systematic risk, I take 
advantage of recent accounting disclosure requirements that force 
financial institutions to report assets at Fair Value (sFAs, 157). 
Fair value is defined by sFAs 157 as “the price that would be 
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly 
1
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transaction between market participants at the measurement date.” 
Furthermore, sFAs 157 requires firms to report assets at Fair 
Value Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3. Level 1 fair value inputs utilize 
quoted prices for identical items in active markets. Level 2 assets 
are valued using quoted prices in active markets for similar items 
or quoted prices in inactive markets for identical items. Market 
information helps to bring validity to such valuation models. 
Finally, Level 3 assets are valued with unobservable, firm-supplied 
estimates based on firm developed models. these models are left 
largely unaffected by market information. As one can certainly 
see, each fair value level indicates progressively more illiquid 
and opaque assets with Level 1 securities being relatively liquid 
and transparent and Level 3 being the most opaque. therefore, by 
decomposing a firm’s equity beta among various types of assets, 
I can begin to analyze the contribution of opacity to a firm’s 
systematic risk. 
As previously noted, finance theory implies that information 
risk – uncertainty regarding the valuation parameters for an 
underlying asset – increases the systematic risk of a firm. 
consequently I expect that Level 2 and 3 assets will lead to 
greater systematic risk compared to other types of assets. stated in 
hypothesis form:
H
1
: Level 2 and 3 assets should be positively related to a 
firm’s equity beta.
I furthermore expect the magnitude of contribution to systematic 
risk to be monotonically increasing across Level 2 and 3 fair value 
assets, stated formally as:
H
2
: Level 3 assets should make a larger contribution to 
systematic risk compared to Level 2 assets.
Finally, I expect that the contribution of Level 2 and 3 assets to 
vary over time. During a financial crisis, opacity leads to increased 
synchronicity of returns. consequently, my third hypothesis is 
stated as follows:
H
3
: Level 2 and 3 assets should make larger contributions to 
systematic risk during times of financial crisis.
III. Sample and Descriptive Statistics
 My sample covers the period March 2007 through september 
2010. commencing the sample in March 2007 allowed me to take 
advantage of FAs 157, which provided financial institutions the 
option to report assets at fair value; however, only beginning in 
March 2008 did the standard become mandatory. I collected data 
to serve as proxies for opacity by identifying the entire sample 
of Bank or Financial Holding companies (BHcs) that file the 
Federal Reserve’s consolidated Financial statements for Bank 
Holding companies (FR Y-9c) and that 1) reported at least one 
positive value at the Level 1, 2, or 3 designation, 2) have total 
assets in excess of $5 billion, and 3) are publicly traded. this led 
to a sample of 99 unique banks with 786 firm quarters of data 
collected. Market data for the sample was collected from the 
center in Research and security Prices (cRsP).
 I computed the percent of assets reported as fair value Level 
2 (FV2) and Level 3 (FV3) from the FR Y-9c. All other assets 
(OA) represent the percent of assets not classified as Level 2 or 3. 
I also computed the leverage (Liab_to_Assets) of the banks as total 
liabilities scaled by total assets. the market beta (MktBeta) was 
computed each quarter for each bank using weekly equity returns 
and the market model as follows:
(1)
where VW represents the cRsP value-weighted index. 
on average, Level 2 (Level 3) assets represent 18.46% 
(1.19%) of total assets.  the average equity beta is 1.58. Figure 1 
plots the average asset composition of firms across the sampled 
time period. of note, in January 2008, revisions to fair value 
accounting standards led firms to report more assets at Level 1 
fair value designation rather than Level 2, thus a precipitous drop 
in Level 2 assets can be seen in the figure. Finally, the calculated 
leverage ratio (total liabilities to total assets) of sampled firms 
followed industry expectations with a mean of 89.12%. 
IV. Empirical Results
 In this section, I first analyze the impact of Level 2 and Level 
3 assets on the systematic risk of the bank. I then examine the 
relative contribution each type of asset makes to overall systematic 
risk and the temporal differences of the impact on systematic risk 
during crisis and non-crisis periods. 
IV.A. Opacity and Equity Risk
 to ascertain the impact of Level 2 and 3 assets on the 
systematic risk of the bank, I estimate the following regression:
(2)
controlling for leverage. the intercept term represents the average 
market beta for other assets (OA), and the coefficients β
1
 and 
β
2
, the marginal contribution of Level 2 and Level 3 assets, 
respectively. table 2 presents the results of estimations using both 
ordinary least squares (oLs) and weighted least squares1 (WLs). 
table 3 displays results with control variables for heterogeneity 
across time (fixed-effects model). 
 All models hold similar and significant degrees of validity. 
coefficients for both Level 2 and Level 3 assets prove to be 
statistically significant at the 5% probability level within each 
model, with Level 3 assets carrying significance at the 1% 
probability level within each. the baseline regressions presented 
in table 2 lack strong r-squared values. However, after controlling 
for time, the oLs Decomposition of Beta with fixed-effects 
provided the greatest goodness of fit measurement with an 
r-squared value of just over 16%. each model’s F-value proved 
statistically significant as well. 
 Interestingly, the results estimate a negative coefficient for 
FV2 assets. such results suggest that, relative to the more opaque 
 
one bank’s assets are particularly hard to value due to their opaque nature, outside investors must turn to idiosyncratic valuation 
parameters of other opaque yet seemingly similar firms. Consequentially, the correlation between the entire industry is intensified. 
As the industry-wide asset composition of financial firms contains relatively greater degrees of opaque assets than the non-
financial industry, investors face difficulty in discriminating across good banks and bad banks (Morgan 2002). Such a scenario 
creates return synchronicity, reduces idiosyncratic risk, and increases systematic risk (Jones, Lee, and Yeager, 2011b).  
To evaluate the impact of opacity on systematic risk, I take advantage of recent accounting disclosure requirements that force 
financial institutions to report assets at Fair Value (SFAS, 157). Fair value is defined by SFAS 157 as “the price that would be 
received to sell an asset or paid to transfer a liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement 
date.” Furthermore, SFAS 157 requires firms to report assets at Fair Value Level 1, Level 2, or Level 3. Level 1 fair value inputs 
utilize quoted prices for identical items in active markets. Level 2 assets are valued using quoted prices in active markets for 
similar items or quoted prices in inactive markets for identical items. Market information helps to bring validity to such valuation 
models. Finally, Level 3 assets are valued with unobservable, firm-supplied estimates based on firm developed models. These 
models are left largely unaffected by market information. As one can certainly see, each fair value level indicates progressively 
more illiquid and opaque assets with Level 1 securities being relatively liquid and transparent and Level 3 being the most opaque. 
Therefore, by decomposing a firm’s equity beta among various types of assets, I can begin to analyze the contribution of opacity to 
a firm’s systematic risk.  
As previously noted, finance theory implies that information risk – uncertainty regarding the valuation parameters for an 
underlying asset – increases the systematic risk of a firm. Consequently I expect that Level 2 and 3 assets will lead to greater 
systematic risk compared to other types of assets. Stated in hypothesis form: 
H1: Level 2 and 3 assets should be positively related to a firm’s equity beta. 
I furthermore expect the magnitude of contribution to systematic risk to be monotonically increasing across Level 2 and 3 fair 
value assets, stated formally as: 
H2: Level 3 assets should make a larger contribution to systematic risk compared to Level 2 assets. 
Finally, I expect that the contribution of Level 2 and 3 assets to vary over time. During a financial crisis, opacity leads to increased 
synchronicity of returns. Consequently, my third hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H3: Level 2 and 3 assets should make larger contributions to systematic risk during times of financial crisis. 
III. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 My sample covers the period March 2007 through September 2010. Commencing the sample in March 2007 allowed us to 
take advantage of FAS 157, which provided financial institutions the option to report assets at fair value; however, only beginning 
in March 2008 did the standard become mandatory. I collected data to serve as proxies for opacity by identifying the entire sample 
of Bank or Financial Holding Companies (BHCs) that file the Federal Reserve’s Consolidated Financial Statements for Bank 
Holding Companies (FR Y-9C) and that 1) reported at least one positive value at the Level 1, 2, or 3 designation, 2) have total 
assets in excess of $5 billion, and 3) are publicly traded. This led to a sample of 99 unique banks with 786 firm quarters of data 
collected. Market data for the sample was collected from the Center in Research and Security Prices (CRSP). 
 I computed the percent of assets rep rted as fair value Level 2 (FV2) and Level 3 (FV3) from the FR Y-9C. All other assets 
(OA) represent th  percent of assets not cl ssified as Level 2 or 3. I also computed the leverage (Liab_to_Assets) of the banks as 
total liabilities s aled by total assets. The market beta (MktBeta) wa computed each quarter for each bank using weekly equity 
retur s and the market model as follows: 
( )i t i t i tr V W      (1) 
where VW represents the CRSP value-weighted index. 
Insert Table 1 and Figure 1 about here 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for e ch variable. On average, Level 2 (Level 3) assets represent 18.46% (1.19%) of 
total as ets. The averag  equity be a is 1.58. Figure 1 plots the average asset composition of firms across the sampled time period. 
Of not , in January 2008, revisions to fair value account ng standards led firms to report more assets at Level 1 fair value 
designation rather th n Level 2, thus a recipitous drop in 2 assets can be seen in the figure. Finally, the calculated leverage 
ratio (tot  liabilities o tot l assets) of sampled firms followed industry expectations with a mean of 89.12%.  
IV. Empirical Results 
 
 In this section, I first analyze the impact of Level 2 and Level 3 assets on the systematic risk of the bank. I then examine the 
relative contribution each type of asset makes to overall systematic risk and the temporal differences of the impact on systematic 
risk during crisis and non-crisis periods.  
IV.A. Opacity and Equity Risk 
 To ascertain the impact of Level 2 and 3 assets on the systematic risk of the bank, I estimate the following regression: 
 1 2 32 3 _ _ij i ij ij ij ijMktBeta FV FV Liab to Assets           (2) 
controlli g for leverage. Th  intercept term repr sents the average market beta for other assets (OA), and the coefficients β1 and β2, 
the marginal contribution of Level 2 and Level 3 assets, respectively. Table 2 presents the results of estimations using both 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted least squares1 (WLS). Table 3 displays results with control variables for heterogeneity 
across time (fixed-effects model).  
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 All models hold similar and significant degrees of validity. Coefficients for both Level 2 and Level 3 assets prove to be 
statistically significant at the 5% probability level within each model, with Level 3 assets carrying significance at the 1% 
probability level within each. The baseline regressions presented in Table 2 lack strong r-squared values. However, after 
controlling for time, the OLS Decomposition of Beta with fixed-effects provided the greatest goodness of fit measurement with an 
r-squared value of just over 16%. Each model’s F-value proved statistically significant as well.  
 In ere tingly, the results estimate a negative coefficient for FV2 assets. Such results suggest that, relative to the more opaque 
FV3 assets, FV2 assets carry with them much less information risk. In fact, it appears that investments in FV2 assets may actually 
reduce a firm’s systematic risk. As noted earlier, FV2 assets are required to be valued “using quoted prices in active markets for 
similar items or quoted prices in inactive markets for identical items.” The transparency of such valuation parameters appears to 
reduce investor uncertainty regarding FV2 assets compared to investment in FV3 assets. Without further asset decomposition 
within each level, however, I am unable to identify specific securities or asset types that contribute to increased transparency.  
 Most salient to the analysis, FV3 assets carry with them a strikingly positive coefficient. For example, in the OLS with fixed 
effects model, the coefficient of 7.613 provides strong evidence that investments in assets reported as Level 3 significantly 
contribute to systematic risk. The finding provides support for the first hypothesis that investments in opaque assets increase a 
firm’s systematic risk. Additionally, the results provide support for the second hypothesis that FV3 assets should have a greater 
impact on syst matic risk than FV2 assets. 
IV.B. Robustness 
 While both the baseline regression and time-controlled models provide evidence that FV3 assets contribute to systematic risk, 
it is possible that illiquidity of the assets, and not opacity, may be driving the results. To remedy this problem and ensure the 
models predict the contributions of opacity rather than liquidity, I expanded the model to control for liquidity by inserting another 
measure into the regression analysis. A proxy for liquidity risk is computed according to the methodology of Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003). Specifically, an OLS time-series regression for each bank i is estimated. 
 r e i, d1, q   i, q i, q * ri, d, q  i, q * sign(r e i, d, q )* vi, d, q  i, d1, q   (3) 
In (3), ri, d, q  is the equity return for firm i on day d in quarter q; r
e
i, d, q, the excess equity return over the CRSP value-weighted for 
day d in quarter q; and vi, d, q , the dollar trading volume on day d in quarter q. The equation is intended to capture return reversals 
related to lack of liquidity. The coefficient of reflects the liquidity risk of the stock and will be negative and larger in magnitude for 
a less liquid stock.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 Table 4 presents the results that include the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor as a control variable. Results are quantitatively 
similar to those presented in Table 3. The liquidity variable fails to achieve statistical significance; therefore my presumption 
regarding the opacity is of FV3 assets becomes stronger. Such results with an included liquidity factor add an important degree of 
qualitative robustness to the study in that I am able to differentiate between the contributions of liquidity and opacity toward equity 
                                     
1 The weight in this regression is the inverse of the standard error from the model used to estimate the market beta, which controls 
for heteroskedasticity across the computed market betas. 
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1 the weight in this regression is the inverse of the standard error from the model used to estimate the market beta, which controls for het roskedasticity across the com-
puted market betas.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for each variable in the study. It also presents the number of quarterly observations both collected and used. 
 
Quarter  Observations  Variable  Mean Median Std Dev 
         
31-Mar-07  9  Dependent Variable     
30-Jun-07  9  MktBeta  1.5845809 1.4922536 0.7254663 
30-Sep-07  9       
31-Dec-07  9  Explanatory Variables     
31-Mar-08  38  OA/Intercept  80.24% 85.35% 24.49% 
30-Jun-08  38  FV2  18.46% 13.64% 23.36% 
30-Sep-08  50  FV3  1.19% 0.32% 1.83% 
31-Dec-08  51  Liab_to_Assets  89.12% 89.85% 7.31% 
31-Mar-09  55       
30-Jun-09  89       
30-Sep-09  90       
31-Dec-09  88       
31-Mar-10  88       
30-Jun-10  86       
30-Sep-10  85       
         
Total Observations Collected  794       
Missing of Observations with Missing Values  8       
         
Total Observations Used  786       
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Fair Value Assets Relative to Total Assets 
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Figure 1: Fair Value Assets Relative to total Assets
able 1: summary statistics for each variable with number of quarterly observations collected and used.
3
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Table 2: Decomposition of equity beta: ordinary least squares and weighted least squares results of regression. 
 
 
  
Ordinary Least Squares Decomposition of Beta 
 
Weighted Least Squares Decomposition of Beta 
       
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
       
Asset Portfolios       
Other Assets/Intercept 1.44931*** 4.67  1.49342*** 6.67 
FV2  -0.5086*** -3.38  -0.26891** -2.32 
FV3  8.89846*** 5.23  9.97159*** 6.19 
Liab_to_assets  0.13405 0.38  -0.20336 -0.8 
       
Model Analysis       
R
2
  0.0358  0.0503 
Adj R
2
  0.0321  0.0467 
F-Value  9.68  13.81 
N  786  786 
 *p< .10, **  p< .05,  ***p< .01 
This table reports the ordinary least squares and weighted least squares results of regressing market beta (scaled equity beta for firm I in quarter j) on the FV2 and FV3 components of the 
decomposed financial asset compositions of sampled firms. The basic model development follows that of Riedl and Serafeim (2009). For both the OLS and WLS models, market beta was 
used as the dependent variable with observations from March 2007 to September 2010. Coefficients and t-statistics for the explanatory variables of OA (all assets not measured at Level 2 or 3 
Fair Value), FV2 (Level 2 Fair Value Assets), FV3 (Level 3 Fair Value Assets), and Liab_to_assets (a leverage component) can be found. 
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Table 2: Decomposition of equity beta: ordinary least squares and weighted least squares results of regression.
FV3 assets, FV2 assets carry with them much less information 
risk. In fact, it appears that investments in FV2 assets may actually 
reduce a firm’s systematic risk. As noted earlier, FV2 assets are 
required to be valued “using quoted prices in active markets for 
similar items or quoted prices in inactive markets for identical 
items.” the transparency of such valuation parameters appears 
to reduce investor uncertainty regarding FV2 assets compared to 
investment in FV3 assets. Without further asset decomposition 
within each level, however, I am unable to identify specific 
securities or asset types that contribute to increased transparency. 
 Most salient to the analysis, FV3 assets carry with them a 
strikingly positive coefficient. For example, in the oLs with fixed 
effects model, the coefficient of 7.613 provides strong evidence 
that investments in assets reported as Level 3 significantly 
contribute to systematic risk. the finding provides support for the 
first hypothesis that investments in opaque assets increase a firm’s 
systematic risk. Additionally, the results provide support for the 
second hypothesis that FV3 assets should have a greater impact on 
systematic risk than FV2 assets.
IV.B. Robustness
 While both the baseline regression and time-controlled models 
provide evidence that FV3 assets contribute to systematic risk, it is 
possible that illiquidity of the assets, and not opacity, may be driving 
the results. to remedy this problem and ensure the models predict 
the contributions of opacity rather than liquidity, I expanded the 
model to control for liquidity by inserting another measure into the 
regression analysis. A proxy for liquidity risk is computed according 
to the methodology of Pastor and stambaugh (2003). specifically, 
an oLs time-series regression for each bank i is estimated.
  
r
e
i, d+1, q = q i, q +f i, q * ri, d, q +gi, q * sign(r
e
i, d, q )* vi, d, q +ei, d+1, q (3)
In (3), 
  
ri, d, q  is the equity return for firm i on day d in quarter q; 
  
r
e
i, d, q, the excess equity return over the cRsP value-weighted for 
day d in quarter q; and 
  
vi, d, q , the dollar trading volume on day d 
in quarter q. the equation is intended to capture return reversals 
related to lack of liquidity. the coefficient of reflects the liquidity 
risk of the stock and will be negative and larger in magnitude for a 
less liquid stock. 
 table 4 presents the results that include the Pastor-stambaugh 
liquidity factor as a control variable. Results are quantitatively 
similar to those presented in table 3. the liquidity variable fails 
to achieve statistical significance; therefore my presumption 
regarding the opacity is of FV3 assets becomes stronger. such 
results with an included liquidity factor add an important degree of 
qualitative robustness to the study in that I am able to differentiate 
between the contributions of liquidity and opacity toward equity 
risk of financial institutions. Furthering the work of Riedl and 
serafeim (2009), I conclude that information risk for Level 3 
assets appears to be primarily attributed to opacity. 
IV.C. Temporal Analysis
 Flannery, Kwan, and nimalendran (2010) suggest that bank 
opacity varies across time. though my study does not attempt to 
validate this claim, I am able to provide evidence about the impact 
of opacity on a systematic risk during times of crisis and non-
crisis. My third hypothesis predicts that during times of financial 
crisis, FV2 and FV3 assets should make greater contributions to 
systematic risk. 
In order to test the third hypothesis, I performed a Fama-
Macbeth (1973) regression procedure and plotted the quarterly 
coefficients in Figure 2, which also highlights key events 
throughout the financial crisis.. notice the spike in the coefficient 
for FV3 assets during the period January 2008 to January 2009. In 
fact, the coefficients for Level 3 assets during the third and fourth 
quarters of 2008 are nearly twice as great in magnitude as from 
the same quarters in the previous year. As markets suddenly revise 
expectations and valuations for such assets, the crisis is further 
exacerbated. 
 
 In this section, I first analyze the impact of Level 2 and Level 3 assets on the systematic risk of the bank. I then examine the 
relative contribution each type of asset makes to overall systematic risk and the temporal differences of the impact on systematic 
risk during crisis and non-crisis periods.  
IV.A. Opacity and Equity Risk 
 To ascertain the im act of Lev l 2 and 3 ssets on the systematic risk of the bank, I estimate the followi g egression: 
 1 2 32 3 _ _ij i ij ij ij ijMktBeta FV FV Liab to Assets           (2) 
controlling for leverage. The intercept ter  represents the average market beta for other assets (OA), and the coefficients β1 and β2, 
the marginal contribution of Level 2 and Level 3 assets, respectively. Table 2 presents the results of estimations using both 
ordinary least squares (OLS) and weighted least squares1 (WLS). Table 3 displays results with control variables for heterogeneity 
across time (fixed-effects mo el).  
Insert Tables 2 and 3 about here 
 All models hold simil r and significant degr es of validity. Coefficients for both Level 2 and Level 3 assets prove to be 
statistically significant at the 5% probability level withi  each model, with Level 3 assets carrying significance at the 1% 
probability level within each. The baseline regressions presented in Table 2 lack strong r-squared values. However, after 
controlling for time, the OLS Decomposition of Beta with fixed-effects provided the greatest goodness of fit measurement with an 
r-squared value of just over 16%. Each model’s F-value proved statistically significant as well.  
 Interestingly, the r sults estimate a negative coefficient for FV2 assets. Such results suggest that, relative to the more opaque 
FV3 assets, FV2 assets carry with them much less information risk. In fact, it appears that investments in FV2 assets may actually 
reduce a firm’s systematic risk. As noted earlier, FV2 assets are required to be valued “using quoted prices in active markets for 
similar items or quoted prices in inactive markets for identical items.” The transpar ncy of such valuation parameters appears to 
reduce investor uncertainty regarding FV2 assets compared to investment in FV3 ts. Without furth r asset decomposition 
within each level, however, I am unable to identify specific securities or asset types that contribute to increased transparency.  
 Most salient to the analysis, FV3 assets carry with them a strikingly positive coefficient. For example, in the OLS with fixed 
effects model, the coefficient of 7.613 provides strong evidence that investments in assets reported as Level 3 significantly 
contribute to systematic risk. The finding provides support for the first hypothesis that investments in opaque assets increase a 
firm’s systematic risk. Additionally, the results provide support for the second hypothesis that FV3 assets should have a greater 
impact on systematic risk than FV2 assets. 
IV.B. Robustness 
 While both the baseline regression and time-controlled models provide evidence that FV3 assets contribute to systematic risk, 
it is possible that illiquidity of the assets, and not opacity, may be driving the results. To remedy this problem and ensure the 
models predict the contributions of opacity rather than liquidity, I expanded the model to control for liquidity by inserting another 
measure into the regression analysis. A proxy for liquidity risk is omputed accordi g to the m thodology of Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003). Specifically, an OLS time-series regression for each bank i is estimated. 
 r e i, d1, q   i, i,  e i, , i, , q  i, d1, q   (3) 
In (3), ri, d, q  is the equity ret rn for fi m i on day d in quarter q; r
e
i, d, q, the excess equity return over the CRSP value-weighted for 
day d in quarter q; and vi, d, q , the dollar trading volume on day d in quarter q. The equation is intended to capture return reversals 
related to lack of liquidity. The coefficient of reflects the liquidity risk of the stock and will be negative and larger in magnitude for 
a less liquid stock.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
 Table 4 presents the results that include the Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor as a control variable. Results are quantitatively 
similar to those presented in Table 3. The liquidity variable fails to achieve statistical significance; therefore my presumption 
regarding the opacity is of FV3 assets becomes stronger. Such results with an included liquidity factor add an important degree of 
qualitative robustness to the study in that I am able to differentiate between the contributions of liquidity and opacity toward equity 
                                     
1 The weight in this regression is the inverse of the standard error from the model used to estimate the market beta, which controls 
for heteroskedasticity across the computed market betas. 
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 to further validate my claim, I performed a seemingly 
unrelated regression (sUR) to compare fair value asset coefficients 
during crisis and non-crisis periods. though economic significance 
appears obvious in Figure 2, a sUR is required to substantiate the 
statistical significance. Results of the sUR models with variables 
for both crisis and non-crisis periods are presented in table 5. As 
expected, F-values that test the difference in coefficients reveal 
that coefficients for both FV2 and FV3 assets are statistically 
higher during the crisis period compared to the coefficients during 
the non-crisis period, thereby confirming the presumption that 
investments in opaque assets carry varying degrees of systematic 
risk across time. 
V. Conclusion
 to summarize, I find that opacity contributes to financial 
instability by exposing firms with heavy investments in Level 
3 fair value assets to a marked degree of systematic risk during 
times of crisis. the lack of transparency associated with these 
assets noticeably alters investors’ risk perceptions, as they face 
uncertainty regarding the valuation parameters used to report 
Level 3 fair value assets. Hence, firms holding large portfolios 
of opaque assets may be among the first to feel the effects of an 
oncoming financial firestorm.
An examination of investments in informationally opaque 
fair value assets by bank holding companies yields significant 
evidence that opacity contributes to the systematic risk of a bank. 
Results signify that the market valuation of financial institutions 
is a product of those institutions’ investments in Level 2 and 3 
fair value assets. Additionally, the results imply that contributions 
of opacity to systematic risk are not consistent over time. During 
periods of turmoil, investments in opaque assets create a greater 
degree of systematic risk than in non-crisis periods. 
 the results suggest that the recent conversation about 
disclosure standards and mark-to-market accounting during times 
of crisis are legitimate. Recent implementation of fair value 
standards has allowed us to better understand how investors 
value different types of assets during varying market conditions. 
Fluctuations in the contributions of assets to systematic risk over 
time, particularly during crisis periods, indicated that current 
disclosure requirements still may not be sufficient to completely 
assuage investor uncertainty concerning such assets. Further 
regulation in the banking industry to bring greater degrees 
of transparency to highly opaque assets may increase market 
efficiency and alleviate the intensity of financial downturns. In 
short, enhanced disclosure standards for illiquid and opaque assets 
appear warranted.      
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Table 3: Decomposition of equity beta with fixed effects, regressing on Level 2 and Level 3 Fair Value Assets. 
 
  
OLS Decomposition of Beta with 
Fixed Effects for Time 
 
WLS Decomposition of Beta with 
Fixed Effects for Time 
 
Decomposition of Beta with Fixed Effects for 
Time (Clustered at Firm Level) 
          
          
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
          
Asset 
Portfolios          
Other Assets/Intercept 1.01857*** 3.23  1.08249*** 4.62  1.0824908*** 7.34 
FV2  -0.40829*** -3.18  -0.35571*** -3.12  -0.3557121** -2.31 
FV3  7.61304*** 4.73  9.86821*** 6.4  9.868206*** 4.36 
Liab_to_assets  0.14341 0.44  -0.03119 0.8974  -0.0311871 -0.25 
 
Time Dummy 
Variables         
Year 08  0.45543*** 3.73  0.11575 1.19  0.1157532 0.51 
Year 09  0.68782*** 5.86  0.56902*** 6.01  0.5690224*** 6.27 
Year 10  0.1224 1.03  0.17774 1.89  0.1777365** 2.07 
          
Model Analysis          
N  786  786  786 
R
2
  0.1622  0.1494  0.1494 
Adj R
2
  0.1558  0.1428    
F-Value  25.14  22.8    
***  p<.01, ** p< .05, and * p< .10 
 
This table presents the results of regressing market beta on the Level 2 and Level 3 Fair Value Assets of firm i in quarter j while controlling for heterogeneity across time using fixed effects. The addition 
of dummy variables for time (Year08, Year09, Year10) in the OLS and WLS models adds robustness to the study. By adding time dummy variables the goodness of fit for the regression (Adj R2) shows 
a relatively large jump from between 3% and 5% in the non-time controlled models to between 14% and 16% in the time controlled models. ***, **, and * represent statistical significance of all relevant 
variables at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Table 3: Decomposition of equity beta with fixed effects, regressing on Level 2 and Level 3 Fair Value Assets.
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Table 4: Decomposition of equity beta adding Pastor-Stambaugh liquidity factor. 
 
  
OLS Decomposition of Beta with 
Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity Factor 
 
WLS Decomposition of Beta with 
Pastor-Stambaugh Liquidity Factor 
 
OLS Decomposition of Beta with Pastor-
Stambaugh Liquidity Factor (Clusterd at Firm-
Level) 
          
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
          
Asset Portfolios          
Other 
Assets/Intercept 
1.01711** 3.23 
 
1.07625*** 4.6 
 
1.0762493*** 7.18 
FV2  -.40660** -3.16  -.35467*** -3.11  -.3546663** -2.31 
FV3  7.58947*** 4.72  9.81575*** 6.37  9.8157497*** 4.42 
Liquidity  -0.72987 -0.67  -1.38156 -1.31  -1.3815591 -0.76 
Liab_to_assets  0.14316 0.44  -0.02785 -0.12  -0.0278478 -0.22 
 
Time Dummy 
Variables 
  
    
  
Year 08  0.45904*** 3.75  0.12366 1.27  0.1236617 0.56 
Year 09  0.68945*** 5.87  .57367*** 6.05  .5736719*** 6.11 
Year 10  0.12471 1.04  .18319* 1.94  .1831876** 2.04 
          
Model Analysis          
N  786  786  786 
R
2
  0.1627  0.1513  0.1513 
Adj R
2
  0.1552  0.1436   
***  p<.01, ** p< .05, and * p< .10 
 
This table presents the results of regressing market beta on the Level 2 and Level 3 Fair Value Assets of firm i in quarter j with a proxy for liquidity risk. The proxy for liquidity risk is computed 
according to the methodology of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). Qualitative analysis of the results remains similar to results of fixed-effects OLS models in Table 3. . ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance of all relevant variables at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Figure 2: Fair Value Coefficients Across Time 
 
 Figure 2: Fair Value coefficients Across time
Table 4: Decomposition of equity beta adding Pastor-stambaugh liquidity factor.
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Table 5: Fama-Macbeth procedure results/tests for differences between crisis and non-crisis periods. 
 
  
OLS Test for Differences Between 
Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods 
 
WLS Test for Differences Between 
Crisis and Non-Crisis Periods 
 
Fama-Macbeth Implied Betas 
           
Variable  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Quarter FV2 Coefficient FV3 Coefficient 
           
Intercept  1.1153*** 3.61  1.15516*** 5.05  31-Mar-07 0.47889 6.9137 
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FV3_NonCrisis  3.43554 1.61  5.26646*** 2.72  31-Mar-08 -0.53859 11.9109 
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***  p<.01, ** p< .05, and * p< .10 
 
This table presents the quarterly implied equity betas of FV2 and FV3 assets from March ’07 through September ’10. It also presents results of seemingly unrelated regressions to test for significance of 
coefficients in crisis and non-crisis periods. F-value’s reveal that the coefficients are statistically higher in crisis periods (defined as March ’08 to January ’09). . ***, **, and * represent statistical 
significance of all relevant variables at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
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Mentor Comments: Professor Jeff Jones describes the manner 
in which Jody took advantage of a recent change in accounting 
disclosure requirements to explore the relationship between 
opacity of assets and bank risk, noting the independence and 
sophistication of his work.
As an important supplier of credit to the economy, a healthy 
banking industry is essential for economic prosperity. The 
opacity of the banking industry, however, can jeopardize 
the health of the industry (and the overall economy) since 
opacity fosters price contagion that exacerbates the cycle 
of speculative bubbles and crashes that create financial 
instability. Price contagion that arises in opaque markets can 
manifest itself in a number of ways, one of which is a change 
in the composition of risk. Since opacity makes it difficult for 
investors to “see inside” individual firms, it tends to decrease 
idiosyncratic (firm-specific) risk and increase systematic risk. 
When the systematic risk of all firms in an industry becomes 
elevated, it creates a high degree of return synchronicity. In 
such an environment, negative information about a single 
firm tends to drive down the stock prices of all firms in 
the industry, creating the potential for a systemic crisis. 
Consequently, understanding how the activities and assets of 
banks impact this process is of critical importance to abating 
the negative consequences of opacity.
I became acquainted with Jody in 2010 while he was a 
student in two of my courses. During this time, we had a 
number of out of class discussions regarding the causes and 
consequences of the recent financial crisis. I shared with him 
some of the research projects I had been working on related 
to the opacity of the banking industry as a contributing 
factor to the financial crisis. Soon after, he approached me 
with an idea that he wished to explore for his Senior Honors 
Thesis. His work on this project has consistently exceeded 
Table 5: Fama-Macbeth procedure results/tests for differences between crisis and non-crisis periods.
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my expectations of an undergraduate student, and in fact 
is of a quality that would rival that of many PhD students. 
I am extremely impressed by how well Jody was able to 
independently process the literature and recognize how to 
make a significant contribution.
In this project, Jody uses a novel approach, made possible by 
a recent accounting change, to investigate how investments 
in opaque assets impact the systematic risk of a bank. The 
recently adopted SFAS 157 requires banks to classify certain 
assets into 3 levels and report them at fair value. Level 1 
assets are considered relatively transparent, and Level 2 
and Level 3 assets are considered increasingly opaque, 
respectively. Jody finds that investing in greater quantities of 
Level 3 assets significantly increases the systematic risk of a 
bank. Moreover, the contribution to systematic risk for both 
Level 2 and Level 3 assets was much higher during the height 
of the 2007-2008 financial crisis compared to periods of 
relative tranquility. Thus, Jody effectively demonstrates how 
the opaqueness of banks can exacerbate a financial crisis, 
providing useful information for policymakers and regulators.
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